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1INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment 
and Appeals Project (“DV LEAP”) is committed 
to combatting domestic violence through litigation, 
legislation, and policy initiatives. DV LEAP has extensive 
experience working with survivors of domestic violence, 
pursuing civil and criminal legal and policy reform efforts 
on their behalf, and filing amicus curiae and party briefs 
in appellate courts and in this Court.
AEquitas: The Prosecutors’ Resource on Violence 
Against Women (“AEquitas”) provides training, research 
assistance, and resources to improve the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes of violence against women.
Futures Without Violence (“FUTURES”) provides 
groundbreaking programs, policies, and campaigns to 
empower individuals and organizations working to end 
violence against women and children around the world. 
FUTURES was a driving force behind the passage of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici, three nationally recognized organizations 
providing advocacy and training, and promoting reform of 
the criminal and civil law pertaining to domestic violence, 
1. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund 
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than 
amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its 
preparation or submission.
2are gravely concerned about the devastating impact 
Petitioners’ position would have on the safety of victims of 
domestic abuse. Petitioners’ proposed result would deeply 
erode the protections of the 1996 amendments to the 
federal Gun Control Act (the “Lautenberg Amendment”), 
by allowing many convicted batterers to possess firearms. 
Amici seek to make clear that (1) Petitioners’ arguments 
as to the meaning of the Lautenberg Amendment are 
incorrect; (2) Petitioners’ position would devastate state 
and federal efforts to keep guns out of the hands of batterers 
due to the practical realities of state prosecutions; and (3) 
Petitioners’ argument that this Court should narrow the 
scope of the firearms prohibition because too many minor 
domestic abuse cases are prosecuted now, completely 
misstates reality.
First, Petitioners’ depiction of how battery2 has 
been prosecuted over time is distorted. The common 
law treatment of battery varied across states and 
unquestionably includes support for a recklessness mens 
rea. Moreover, both the unsettled nature of the common 
law’s treatment of the mens rea for battery, and this 
Court’s decisions in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990), and Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 
(2014), make clear that the common law, while an important 
starting place, cannot be an outer limit on the meaning 
of the statute’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence” (“MCDV”) in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
Rather, the legislative history indicates that MCDVs 
were intended to include convictions under contemporary 
2.  As noted by the Government, “assault” and “battery” are 
often “used interchangeably” in criminal law. Brief for the United 
States (“Gov. Br.”) at 14 n. 2. Amici will do the same.
3statutes and that reckless crimes were very much on the 
sponsors’ minds.
Second, the practicalities of state misdemeanor 
prosecutions mean that the result Petitioners seek would 
render the Lautenberg Amendment protections largely 
meaningless in the numerous jurisdictions with “divisible” 
statutes, which permit conviction under more than one 
mens rea level, because such adjudications rarely produce 
documentation of the specific mens rea for the conviction. 
As a result, excluding recklessness from the MCDV 
definition would mean that convicted domestic violence 
misdemeanants in a substantial number of states would 
still have access to firearms, despite the Lautenberg 
Amendment.
Third, contrary to Petitioners’ contention, reckless 
domestic batteries are neither “minor” nor “accidental,” 
and removal of firearms from such perpetrators is not 
“unjust,” but a matter of common sense. Reckless battery 
involves “conscious disregard” of the risk of harm, and 
in the domestic violence context, is only a small piece of 
a larger pattern of highly intentional coercive control. 
Moreover, many incidents that may appear “minor” in 
a vacuum are often immediately followed by homicide. 
Guns provide abusers with an effective tool for terrorizing 
victims and significantly increase the likelihood of fatal 
violence.
Finally, there is no factual basis to support Petitioners’ 
claim that too many misdemeanor offenses are “swept” 
into a criminal justice system that has eliminated 
discretion in arrests and prosecution. Even today, only a 
tiny percentage of all domestic violence crimes that occur 
4result in conviction. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
Petitioners’ efforts to keep guns in the hands of convicted 
domestic abusers and should hold that the Lautenberg 
Amendment’s definition of an MCDV includes convictions 
for reckless domestic battery.
ARGUMENT
I. W H I L E  T H E  C O M M O N  L AW  I S  N O T 
C ON T R OL L I NG ,  I T  A L S O  S U PP OR T S 
INTERPRETING THE WORD “USE” IN THE 
PHRASE “USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE” TO 
INCLUDE A RECKLESSNESS MENS REA.
Relying on Castleman, Petitioners argue that 
Congress intended to incorporate “the common-law 
definition of battery” when adopting the phrase “use of 
physical force” in the definition of an MCDV and that the 
common law precluded battery based on recklessness 
as a mens rea. Brief for Petitioners (“Pet. Br.”) at 13-17. 
However, Petitioners overstate the role of the common 
law in construing Section 922(g)(9), and they misstate the 
common law view of the mens rea for battery.
A. The Common Law Provides a Floor, but not a 
Ceiling in Defining a Misdemeanor Crime of 
Domestic Violence.
The Lautenberg Amendment bars individuals 
convicted of an MCDV from possessing firearms. An 
MCDV is defined, in pertinent part, as a “misdemeanor 
under Federal, State, or Tribal law” that “has, as an 
element, the use or attempted use of physical force…” 18 
U.S.C. § 921(33)(A)(i-ii). In Castleman, this Court 
5consulted the common law to answer the question of 
whether an “offensive touching” battery could be classified 
as a “use of physical force,” despite the fact that relatively 
little “force” was required for the crime. Castleman, 134 
S. Ct. at 1410. Concluding that, as a historical matter, 
the common law’s “misdemeanor-specific meaning of 
‘force’” for the actus reus of battery is “satisfied by even 
the slightest offensive touching,” the Court held that an 
MCDV does indeed include an offensive touching battery. 
Id. at 1410, 1413.
In Castleman, the common law was used to support 
an application of the Lautenberg Amendment to a 
purportedly minor battery of offensive touching, not to 
limit its application. The Court stated that Congress 
“incorporated” the common law — a non-exclusive 
term suggesting the common law was “included” in the 
definition, but not implying - and certainly not holding - 
that if the common law fails to answer the question, or if 
modern state statutes and case law differ from earlier 
common law, contemporary usages of “misdemeanor” or 
“use of physical force” would necessarily be excluded from 
the definition of MCDVs. See id. at 1410.
Indeed, this Court has “declined to follow any rule that 
a statutory term is to be given its common-law meaning, 
when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the 
statute’s purpose.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 594-95. Here, 
limiting the statute as Petitioners propose would fly in the 
face of Congressional intent and the plain language of the 
statute, which expresses, without doubt, Congressional 
intent to treat misdemeanor convictions under state, 
Tribal, or federal law as the predicate offenses for the 
federal firearm prohibition.
6In fact, the remarks of sponsors and other senators 
when the Lautenberg Amendment was enacted signaled 
concern about reckless abusive behavior that could cause 
death or grievous injury when guns are available. See, 
e.g., 142 Cong. reC. S11872-01 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Lautenberg) (describing the law’s application 
to scenarios in which domestic arguments “get out of 
control,” “the anger will get physical” and one partner 
will commit assault “almost without knowing what he is 
doing”); 142 Cong. reC. S10379 (Sept. 12, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Feinstein) (describing concern that guns “might 
do . . . harm” when domestic “violence get[s] out of hand,” 
“result[ing] in tragedy”). As these remarks illustrate, 
Congress was concerned not only with intentional injuries, 
but also with volatile situations that could spiral out of 
control. See also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 
426-27 (2009) (the “manifest purpose” of § 922(g)(9) 
was to remedy the “potentially deadly combination” of 
“[f]irearms and domestic strife”).
Congressional intent with regard to the term “use 
of physical force” is also clear: As Senator Lautenberg 
explained, that phrase was inserted in order to ensure 
that purely property-related crimes, such as “cutting up 
a credit card with a pair of scissors,” would be excluded 
from the definition of MCDV. 142 Cong. reC. S11872-01. 
No reference was made to the common law meaning of 
the phrase “use of physical force.” Id.
Indeed, Senator Lautenberg spoke at length about 
the importance of identifying predicate offenses that fit 
the MCDV definition, without once mentioning mens rea:
7[C]onvictions for domestic violence-related 
crimes often are for crimes, such as assault, 
that are not explicitly identified as related to 
domestic violence. Therefore, it will not always 
be possible for law enforcement authorities to 
determine from the face of someone’s criminal 
record whether a particular misdemeanor 
conviction involves domestic violence, as 
defined	in	the	new	law	.	.	.	I	would	strongly	urge	
law enforcement authorities to thoroughly 
investigate misdemeanor convictions on an 
applicant’s criminal record to ensure that none 
involves domestic violence, before allowing the 
sale of a handgun. After all, for many battered 
women and abused children, whether their 
abuser gets access to a gun will be nothing 
short of a matter of life and death.
142 Cong. reC. S11872-01, (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Lautenberg) (emphasis added). Despite this in-depth 
focus on how conviction records would need to be explained 
to identify MCDVs, neither Senator Lautenberg, nor 
anyone else offering remarks about the amendment, 
expressed any concern about identifying the mens rea of 
a predicate offense; it is therefore apparent that excluding 
state convictions for reckless acts was neither considered 
nor intended. 
Thus, the most one can say about the role of the 
common law in interpreting the definition of an MCDV 
and the term “use of physical force,” is that the common 
law provides a floor, but not a ceiling or limit on the crimes 
included as predicate offenses. Neither Castleman, the 
language of the statute, nor anything in the legislative 
8history suggests that Congress sought to limit the scope 
of application of the Lautenberg Amendment to only those 
crimes that were recognized at common law.
B. The Common Law is Diverse, but Supports a 
Mens Rea of Recklessness for Battery.
To whatever extent the common law informs the 
interpretation of “use of physical force,” it provides 
support for including reckless crimes, although it is far 
from uniform.
Petitioners assert that there is a well-settled common-
law definition of battery that “makes clear that the 
crime could be committed only with the mental state of 
intentional or knowing conduct.” Pet. Br. at 15. However, 
Petitioners acknowledge that “Blackstone described 
battery as ‘[t]he least touching of another’s person 
willfully, or in anger.’” Pet. Br. at 15-16 (quoting 3 William 
Blackstone, CommentArIes on the lAWs oF englAnd 120 
(1768)). Blackstone’s distinction between “willfulness” and 
“anger” could not be a clearer indication that something 
less than purpose or knowledge was contemplated. Indeed, 
the reference to “anger” captures the classic reckless 
crime, in which the perpetrator is enraged, and behaves 
recklessly in a manner which is dangerous, but not with 
a specific intent to harm. See, e.g., statements of Sens. 
Lautenberg and Feinstein, supra at 7. See also Gov. Br. 
at 16-22 (citing multiple early sources).
Moreover, here is what members of Congress would 
have found if they had looked to neighboring states to 
investigate whether there was a “common law definition 
of battery” (Pet. Br. at 13) before enacting § 922(g)(9):
9If Congress had looked nearby to Maryland, the 
common law of Maryland defines battery to include 
offensive physical contact that is the result of a reckless 
act. See Nicolas v. State, 44 A.3d 396, 406-07 (Md. 2012) 
(noting that statute codified the common law meaning, 
which included offensive physical contact that was the 
result of an intentional or reckless act of the defendant).
If Congress looked across the Potomac to Virginia, 
the common law of Virginia defines battery to include 
conduct “which showed a reckless and wanton disregard 
for human life and safety.” See Davis v. Commonwealth, 
143 S.E. 641, 643 (Va. 1928). Virginia courts also capture 
the Blackstone formulation, holding that a battery includes 
any touching “in rudeness or in anger” or “willfully or in 
anger.” See Lynch v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 427, 428 
(Va. 1921).3
Petitioners, in identifying some examples in which 
common-law battery required more than recklessness, 
have at most shown that the common law is varied. Pet. 
Br. at 15-16. But Congress could not have intended to 
incorporate “the well-settled” or “widely accepted” 
common-law definition of battery, if there is not one 
well-settled or widely accepted common-law definition. 
See Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013) 
(“Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning 
of the common-law terms it uses”) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
3.  See also Vines v. United States, 70 A.3d 1170, 1180 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 2013)(allowing “a finder of fact to infer the general intent to 
commit a crime from reckless conduct” and applying that to statutory 
“simple assault”).
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246, 263 (1952) (allowing courts to presume that Congress 
knows of and adopts “widely accepted definitions” of 
terms of art that it uses, absent contrary direction). In the 
absence of a uniform common law definition, therefore, the 
plain meaning statutory interpretation of the Lautenberg 
Amendment would include any MCDV under which a 
defendant was convicted, with whatever mens rea the 
applicable federal, state, or Tribal statute required.
II. EXCLUDING RECKLESSNESS FROM THE 
DEFINITION OF AN MCDV WOULD RENDER 
THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT LARGELY 
INEFFECTUAL IN MANY STATES DUE TO 
THE PRACTICALITIES OF MISDEMEANOR 
ADJUDICATIONS.
Amici agree with the Government’s assertion that, 
if reckless crimes are excluded from the definition of 
an MCDV, the Lautenberg Amendment would become a 
“dead letter” in a majority of states under an elements-
based “categorical approach” to determining whether a 
predicate offense qualifies as an MCDV. Hayes, 555 U.S. 
at 427 (rejecting an interpretation under which § 922(g)(9) 
would have been a “dead letter”); Gov. Br. at 38-40. Amici 
explain herein that, due to the realities of misdemeanor 
prosecution, even if this Court’s modified categorical 
approach is applied to states with “divisible” statutes4 
that theoretically permit courts to identify the mens rea 
under which a defendant was convicted, the result will be 
no different.
4.  Amici join the United States in recognizing that the 
definition of a “divisible” statute is currently in contention. Gov. Br. 
at 44.
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A. The Application of the Modified Categorical 
Approach to State Assault and Battery 
Convictions
This Court has required a purely elements-based 
approach to determining whether a state conviction 
constitutes a predicate offense for a federal statutory 
crime. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281-
82 (2013). Where, however, statutes contain alternative 
elements by which an offense can be proven, some 
combinations of which will qualify as a predicate offense 
and others that will not (i.e., “divisible” statutes), courts 
are permitted to look to the record to determine which 
elements formed the basis for conviction in a given case. See 
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13, 19-21 (2005); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (2013) 
(recognizing the “modified categorical approach”). Under 
this “modified categorical approach,” it is permissible to 
examine certain reliable “approved documents,” such as 
the charging instrument, plea agreement forms, the plea 
colloquy, jury instructions, or judgment of conviction to 
determine exactly which elements formed the basis for 
the defendant’s conviction. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25-26; 
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283-85.
As this Court has repeatedly observed, “perpetrators 
of domestic violence are ‘routinely prosecuted under 
generally applicable assault or battery laws.’” Castleman, 
134 S.Ct. at 1411 (quoting Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427). As 
shown in Appendices B and C of the Government’s Brief, 
at least 16 states have assault or battery statutes that 
list (in the same subsection) more than one mens rea 
level including recklessness, any of which will suffice for 
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conviction if bodily injury results.5 These statutes are, 
in principle, “divisible” under the Descamps framework, 
and theoretically permit a review of reliable “approved 
documents.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20-21. Nevertheless, 
the manner in which such crimes are adjudicated—
whether by guilty plea or by trial—only rarely generates 
documentation sufficient to identify the basis for the 
conviction. Where the mens rea cannot be determined, the 
conviction must be presumed to have been based on the 
lowest level of culpability (i.e., recklessness). See Johnson 
v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010). Thus, however 
purposeful/intentional or knowing the offender’s conduct 
may actually have been, the absence of a reliable means 
to ascertain the basis for a domestic violence conviction 
means the convicted offender will not be prohibited from 
obtaining a firearm, if convictions based on recklessness do 
not qualify as MCDVs. Several factors in the adjudication 
process contribute to this result.6
1. Charging
If a misdemeanor crime is the only offense charged, the 
charging document is likely to simply track the language 
of the statute. A charge for simple assault is likely to allege 
5.  These jurisdictions include Arizona; Colorado; Delaware; 
Hawaii; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Mississippi; Nebraska; New 
Jersey; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Tennessee; Texas; Vermont; Wyoming. 
See Gov. Br. at App. B and C. 
6.  Much of the information incorporated in Section II of this 
brief is based on the experience and insights of Attorney Advisor 
Teresa Garvey of amicus AEquitas, who prosecuted thousands 
of domestic violence crimes, the vast majority of which involved 
assaults, over a 22-year career as an Assistant Prosecutor in Camden 
County, New Jersey.
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that on a particular date and time, in a specific place, the 
defendant “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly” inflicted 
bodily injury on the victim. By charging all of the possible 
alternatives, the prosecutor increases the likelihood that 
at least the minimum requisite culpability can be proven. 
The prosecutor has nothing to gain by charging that a 
defendant acted purposely if reckless conduct will suffice 
for a conviction. Thus, the charging document itself is 
unlikely, in most cases, to shed any light on the culpability 
element for which the defendant was convicted.
2. Guilty pleas
Tens of thousands of crimes of domestic violence—
both felonies and misdemeanors—are prosecuted in the 
United States every year.7 The vast majority of domestic 
violence crimes, like other crimes, are disposed of without 
trial—most often by plea agreement.8
A vast range of options is available to prosecutors 
and defense attorneys in the plea bargaining context 
7.  While exact statistics for domestic violence prosecution are 
not available, a 2000 study of arrests in 18 states and the District of 
Columbia indicates there were in that year 82,056 arrests for crimes 
of violence, including aggravated and simple assault, in which the 
offender/victim relationship was spouse, parent, or son/daughter. 
Matthew R. Durose, et al., Family Violence Statistics, u.s. doJ, 
bureAu oF Just. stAt. 1, 41 (2005), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fvs.pdf.
8.  See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) (noting that 94% 
of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas). Other possible 
dispositions include dismissal of charges for unprovable cases or, in 
some instances, a deferred disposition or referral to a diversionary 
program.
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for assaultive crimes. In addition to negotiating a 
recommended sentence or other disposition within the 
available statutory range, typically a number of different 
criminal charges could potentially apply to a given set 
of facts, each with its own range of potential sentences.9
When a plea offer for a felony or misdemeanor 
offense is extended, the prosecutor in a jurisdiction with 
multiple culpability elements generally has no reason to 
be concerned with the defendant’s state of mind at the 
time of the offense, so long as the minimum culpability 
is admitted. The recommended sentence within the 
statutory range has probably already been agreed upon; 
moreover, even in the case of an “open” plea with no 
specific sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor is 
unlikely to insist upon a plea to a crime committed with a 
specific state of mind. There is usually no real or perceived 
benefit in doing so. The sentencing range is the same; the 
defendant’s future criminal record will reflect a conviction 
for the same offense regardless of the defendant’s state of 
mind. Thus, any plea agreement documents are unlikely 
to specify a particular culpability level.
9.  Under the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), for example, 
depending upon the quantum of bodily injury risked or inflicted, 
the defendant’s state of mind, and whether or not a deadly weapon 
was used, assault can range from a petty misdemeanor (MPC 
§ 250.4(4), harassment by offensive touching), to a misdemeanor 
(MPC § 211.1(1), simple assault), to a third-degree felony (MPC 
§ 211.1(2)(b), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), to a second-
degree felony (MPC § 211.1(2)(a), aggravated assault by attempting 
to cause or causing serious bodily injury) – with associated sentences 
ranging from a handful of days to up to ten years. MPC §§ 6.08, 
6.06(3), 6.06(2).
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The plea colloquy is unlikely to be of any assistance, 
either, in determining what crime a defendant has admitted 
in his guilty plea, assuming that a transcript of the 
colloquy exists. Defendants are, understandably, likely to 
minimize their actions as the product of reckless behavior 
rather than admitting purposeful or knowing infliction of 
injury—provided the statute allows it. By permitting the 
defendant to “save face” in this manner, the prosecutor 
may be more likely to secure a satisfactory guilty plea to 
the misdemeanor offense, and many defendants will take 
advantage of the opportunity to minimize their conduct to 
the extent possible, consistent with their plea agreement.
The trial judge accepting a guilty plea typically has no 
reason to be concerned about whether a defendant admits 
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly inflicting injury, 
especially in the context of a simple assault or battery, 
where the range of punishment is usually limited. So long 
as the defendant admits guilt of the offense and at least 
the minimum required culpability, the judge is likely to 
accept the guilty plea, and the judgment of conviction will 
simply indicate the crime of conviction without specifying 
a particular level of culpability.
Whatever the evidence might have shown in terms 
of the defendant’s intent to commit the crime, when a 
defendant pleads guilty to a simple assault or battery 
in any of the states with alternative levels of culpability, 
neither the charging document, nor the plea agreement 
documents, nor the plea colloquy, nor the judgment 
of conviction is likely to reflect anything more than 
recklessness.
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3. Conviction after trial
Even in the trial context, regardless of whether 
the defendant is tried only for the misdemeanor offense 
or tried for a more serious felony but convicted of a 
misdemeanor as a lesser-included offense,10 the same 
kinds of considerations will impact the availability of 
documents sufficient to determine the judge’s or jury’s 
findings with regard to the defendant’s state of mind. 
There is seldom any reason for prosecutors, judges, 
defendants, or defense attorneys to be concerned about 
the nice distinctions between various levels of culpability 
that result in conviction for the same offense with the 
same range of available sentences; that lack of concern 
will be reflected in documents devoid of any indication of 
the culpability for the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted.
First, jury instructions for a simple assault or 
battery crime with alternative culpability elements will 
usually encompass all of the possible alternatives and are 
therefore unlikely to reveal whether reckless conduct, or 
something more, was the basis for the jury’s verdict.
10.  Even when cases are prosecuted as felonies and taken to 
trial, misdemeanor offenses are often lesser-included crimes that the 
fact-finder must consider if the defendant is found not guilty of the 
charged greater offense. If, for example, there is reasonable doubt 
as to whether a victim’s injury qualifies as “serious bodily injury,” 
the fact-finder may be called upon to consider whether the defendant 
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly caused a lesser degree of bodily 
injury and should, therefore, be found guilty of simple assault rather 
than aggravated assault.
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Second, proof problems that are common in domestic 
violence cases increase the likelihood of the jury returning 
a verdict of guilt on a lesser-included misdemeanor 
offense even where the defendant is being tried for a 
felony assault. Often the only eyewitness to a domestic 
violence assault is the victim, who may be reluctant to 
participate, fail to appear in response to subpoena, recant 
a prior statement, minimize the defendant’s conduct, or 
even testify on behalf of the defendant. 11 In such cases, 
there is an increased likelihood that a guilty verdict (if 
one is returned) will be to a lesser-included offense, such 
as a simple assault.
Third, in bench trials, a judge rendering a verdict 
may issue findings of fact as part of that verdict, and 
those findings might reveal the judge’s findings as to the 
defendant’s culpability. However, it is likely that such 
findings will extend only to the minimum culpability 
necessary to support a finding of guilt, since that is the 
only finding the judge would be required to make for 
purposes of rendering the verdict.
Even under the modified categorical approach, 
therefore, the record is highly unlikely to disclose a basis 
for conviction greater than recklessness. If recklessness is 
excluded from the MCDV definition, the vast majority of 
convicted defendants in these jurisdictions would still be 
free to possess a firearm. This result would eviscerate the 
11.  Victims of domestic violence are far more likely to avoid 
participating in criminal trials or to recant their accusations than 
any other crime victims. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After 
Crawford, 91 vA. l. r. 747, 768 (2005). It is estimated that victims of 
domestic battery recant or refuse to participate in the prosecution 
approximately 80-90% of the time. Id.
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protection Congress intended to afford victims of domestic 
violence when it enacted the Lautenberg Amendment.
III. RECKLESSNESS IS BOTH SERIOUS AND 
DANGEROUS, PARTICULARLY WHEN GUNS 
A N D / O R  D OM E S T IC  V IOL E NC E  A R E 
INVOLVED.
A substantial portion of Petitioners’ brief is devoted 
to suggesting that misdemeanor convictions for reckless 
conduct, particularly in the domestic violence context, 
penalize conduct that is only “accidental,” “minor,” and 
that often involves “minor harms or no harm at all.” 
Pet. Br. at 21, 25, 32. Petitioners therefore argue that 
“a lifetime ban on firearm possession based on reckless 
conduct presents an insufficient connection between the 
target concern, protecting victims of domestic violence, 
and the remedy, disarming perpetrators of domestic 
violence.’” Id. at 34. To the contrary, copious evidence 
supports Congress’s judgment that those who act with 
conscious disregard of the risk of injury to their domestic 
partners should not possess guns.
A. Recklessness is Widely and Authoritatively 
Recognized as Criminally Blameworthy and 
Dangerous Conduct.
Petit ioners mischaracter ize recklessness as 
“accidental” conduct, and suggest that, particularly when 
linked to offensive touching, such non-intentional offenses 
do not warrant removing a perpetrator’s firearms. Id. 
at 21, 34. Their characterization of both recklessness 
and reckless offensive contact, however, ignores the 
well-settled acceptance of recklessness as a culpability 
standard, and erroneously suggests a legally relevant 
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difference between reckless battery convictions arising 
from offensive contact or causing injury.
Reckless conduct is far more than an accident, and 
in some settings – such as those involving firearms – is 
extremely dangerous. Both Maine’s criminal statute and 
the Model Penal Code define recklessness as requiring 
that a person “consciously disregards” a risk that person’s 
conduct will cause an unjustified result. me. rev. stAt. 
17-A § 35(3)(A) and (C).12 See MPC § 2.02(2)(c) (“A person 
acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an 
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk . . .”). Reckless battery, therefore, 
necessarily entails much more than carelessness or 
“accident”: the perpetrator knows that his conduct 
imposes a substantial risk of unacceptable harm to the 
victim, yet consciously chooses to disregard that risk and 
intentionally engages in that conduct anyway.
That recklessness is a serious and credible basis for 
criminal culpability is underlined by the fact that the 
Model Penal Code, produced by the leading criminal law 
experts in the country after extensive deliberations,13 
specifically assigns recklessness as the minimum default 
12.  “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of the 
person’s conduct when the person consciously disregards a risk that 
the person’s conduct will cause such a result . . . the disregard of the 
risk . . . must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct 
that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same 
situation.” me. rev. stAt. 17-A § 35(3)(A) and (C).
13.  See Project Life Cycle, https://www.ali.org/projects/
project-life-cycle (last visited Jan. 21) (describing the “diverse group 
of practitioners, judges, and scholars” who are “selected for their 
particular knowledge and experience of the subject” who develop the 
American Law Institute’s projects, including the Model Penal Code).
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mens rea for offenses with no specified intent requirement. 
MPC § 2.02(3).14 The MPC is considered a highly influential 
articulation of standards of criminal culpability.15 Given 
the purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment – to keep 
guns out of the hands of domestic abusers – it is unlikely 
that Congress would have sought to be more restrictive 
than the MPC. See Remarks of Sens. Feinstein and 
Lautenberg, supra at 7.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that reckless conduct, 
particularly with guns, is extremely dangerous. For 
example, one caller to the National Domestic Violence 
Hotline reported “My abuser has played Russian Roulette 
with me before and has pulled the trigger.” Other callers 
have reported that their abusers have fired a gun in the 
14.  While this Court in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 
(2015), declined to reach the question of whether the Court should 
likewise read recklessness into a federal threat statute, Justice 
Alito’s concurrence made a strong case for it: “[W]hen Congress 
does not specify a mens rea in a criminal statute, we have no 
justification for inferring that anything more than recklessness is 
needed . . . There can be no real dispute that recklessness regarding 
a risk of serious harm is wrongful conduct.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 
2015 (Alito, J).
15.  Richard G. Singer, Foreward, 19 rutgers l. J. 519-20 
(1988) (“celebrat[ing] and reflect[ing] upon one of the most historic 
documents in the history of the criminal law . . . the crowning 
achievement of the Code [is that] it has brought unity and cogency to 
the chaos of the common law and its development in this country.”); 
Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral 
Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 671 (1988) (echoing Herbert Packer’s “accolades for the Code” 
because it “‘restored intellectual respectability to the substantive 
criminal law . . .’”).
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house, held it up to them while arguing, and worse.16 See 
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408-09 (noting that the presence 
of a gun in a home significantly increases the probability 
of death in incidents of domestic violence), citing Jacquelyn 
C. Campbell, et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate 
Partner Homicide, 250 nAt. Inst oF Just. J. 16 (2003) 
(“When a gun was in the house, an abused woman was 6 
times more likely than other abused women to be killed”).17
In addition, Petitioners misleadingly suggest 
that offensive contact, when committed recklessly, is 
somehow more minor or less a concern with regard to 
gun possession than reckless battery that causes injury.18 
16.  “The children’s father has held up the gun to my head in 
front of my two girl [sic] and unlocked the safety . . . When I tried 
to break up with him he turned the gun away from me and shot it. 
And the craziest thing is he was a convicted felon in [Text Removed] 
and they handed him his gun license right back.” These examples 
come from survey data and call summaries compiled by the National 
Domestic Violence Hotline and provided by electronic mail to amicus 
DV LEAP on 1/20/2016. 
17.  According to the Centers for Disease Control, more female 
intimate partners are killed by firearms than by all other means 
combined. Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current 
Domestic Violence Research, Part II: Prosecution, u.s. doJ rePort 
36 (2008), citing Leonard J. Paulkossi, Surveillance for Homicide 
among Intimate Partners-United States, 1991-1998, morbIdIty And 
mortAlIty WeeKly surveIllAnCe summArIes 5, 1-16 (2001). 
18.  The question on which this Court granted certiorari 
was stated in the Petition for Certiorari as “Does a misdemeanor 
crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualify as a ‘misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) 
and 922(g)(9)?” Pet. Br. at (i). Petitioners’ merits brief appears to 
narrow that question. Pet. Br. at 1-2 (“[t]his case presents a narrow 
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The distinction has no salience, however, in this context. 
The very nature of reckless battery entails conscious 
disregard by the perpetrator of the risk to the victim. 
Reckless batteries resulting in serious injury are often 
distinguished from reckless offensive touching solely 
by happenstance – nothing else. To build on the First 
Circuit’s example, recklessly throwing a knife towards a 
battered spouse could result in a deep gash or could just 
graze the victim without causing injury. United States 
v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 185 (1st Cir. 2015). Whether the 
conduct injures or offends, and the severity of any injury, 
are purely a matter of chance, beyond the abuser’s control. 
In these circumstances, as a legal matter, the abuser’s 
conduct and culpability for consciously placing the victim 
at risk of harm is identical regardless of the ultimate 
degree of harm. As this Court held in Castleman, the 
Lautenberg Amendment’s definition of misdemeanor 
crimes of domestic violence encompasses both violent 
“severe domestic abuse” and domestic battery that 
involves offensive contact. 134 S. Ct. at 1413, 1415. There 
is neither a legal nor public policy basis to distinguish 
between the two for purposes of the mens rea question 
before the Court.
question of statutory interpretation: Whether the ‘use or attempted 
use of physical force’ under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) extends to 
merely reckless (as opposed to intentional) offensive physical 
contact”) (emphasis added). As described in this Section, however, 
the distinction Petitioners attempt to draw is legally irrelevant and 
misleading.
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B. Even Reckless and Seemingly Minor Domestic 
Violence Crimes are Often Linked to an 
Abuser’s Intentional Coercive Control Over the 
Victim and to Serious Risk of Lethal Harm.
1. Reckless batteries are part of an intentional 
course of conduct.
Petitioners minimize reckless domestic violence 
crimes as “accidental,” “minor” or “less serious,” Pet. 
Br. at 24-25, 28, 32, and miss the essential defining 
characteristic of abusers’ violence against their partners: 
an intentional pattern of coercive control that constantly 
exposes victims to danger. As this Court has recognized, 
domestic violence is rarely a single incident, but is typified 
by an ongoing pattern of abuse and a dynamic of power 
and control.19 Leading researchers describe domestic 
battering as “a course of calculated, malevolent conduct, 
deployed almost exclusively by men to dominate individual 
women, by interweaving repeated physical abuse with 
three equally important tactics: intimidation, isolation and 
19.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 889-93 (1992) (“Wife-battering or abuse can take on many 
physical and psychological forms . . . it is common for the battering 
husband to also abuse the children in an attempt to coerce the wife.... 
Many [women] may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse 
from their husbands, including verbal harassment, threats of future 
violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement to the 
home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the 
abortion to family and friends”). See also Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 
1411 (“‘Domestic violence’ is not merely a type of ‘violence’; it is a 
term of art encompassing acts that one might not characterize as 
‘violent’ in a nondomestic context. See Brief for National Network to 
End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae 4–9.”).
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control.”20 In most domestic violence, the “batterer’s quest 
for control of the woman [lies] at the heart of the battering 
process.”21 Guns are frequently used in furtherance of this 
process. In a survey of 417 women in 67 battered women’s 
shelters in California, for example, 65% of women who 
lived in homes with guns before seeking shelter reported 
that their abuser had used a gun to scare, threaten or 
harm them.22 See generally, Brief of Domestic Violence 
Hotline, et al.
Thus, even when a particular charged crime involves 
a mens rea of recklessness and an actus reus of offensive 
contact, the individual crime charged is typically only one 
part of a larger pattern of intentional, malevolent, and 
purposeful conduct. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“the 
accumulation of such [minor] acts over time can subject 
one intimate partner to the other’s control”). It is therefore 
not at all out of proportion for Congress to remove guns 
from those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic 
violence with a recklessness mens rea.
20.  Evan Stark, CoerCIve Control: hoW men entrA P 
Women In PersonAl lIFe 5 (2007). See also Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 northWestern J. oF CrIm. lAW 
& CrImInology 959, 962-963 (2003-2004) (“Outside the criminal law 
context, domestic violence is widely understood as an ongoing pattern 
of behavior defined by both physical and non-physical manifestations 
of power. This is a remarkably uncontroversial proposition. For 
women whose lives it describes, the oft-described ‘power and control’ 
dynamic is ubiquitous. . . .”).
21.  Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining	the	Issue	of	Separation, 90 mICh. l. rev. 5 (1991).
22. Susan B. Sorenson & Douglass J. Wiebe, Weapons in the 
Lives of Battered Women. 94 Am. J. oF Pub. heAlth 1412-17 (2004). 
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2. Seemingly minor acts can be injurious, 
terrifying, and harbingers of homicide.
Moreover, even individual reckless acts that may 
appear “minor” often entail risk of serious harm or 
compound victims’ terror. For instance, Amici have 
handled cases in which (i) an abuser recklessly hurled a 
jar in the direction of his partner, missing her but almost 
hitting her baby; (ii) the abuser angrily slammed the 
door on his partner who was trying to leave, crushing her 
fingers; and (iii) an abuser threw a plate of hot food at his 
partner, leaving her uninjured but with food dripping from 
her face and hair. Regardless of whether severe, minor, 
or no injury results, such conduct displays a volatility that 
terrorizes and controls the victim. This is so regardless 
of whether the act itself was intended to injure the victim 
or just to express the perpetrator’s rage – and regardless 
of whether injury or only “offensive touching” results. 
In short, criminalizing possession of firearms based on 
“minor acts” such as this is not excessive in relation to 
either the risks posed by the conduct or its over-arching 
intent, regardless of whether the particular act was 
intentionally or recklessly committed and of the severity 
of the resulting contact.
Indeed, seemingly “minor” acts of domestic violence 
are sometimes only minutes away from homicide. For 
example, in Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 
U.S. 748 (2005), the police ignored a mother’s repeated 
pleas to arrest her estranged husband for violating 
her protection order when he took the children without 
permission; the father then murdered the children. Id. 
at 751-754. See also Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d 
272, 273 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1996) (after police failed to arrest 
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respondent who violated stay-away provision and merely 
escorted him from the premises, he returned and shot 
the victim); Mastroianni v. County of Suffolk, 91 N.Y.2d 
198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1997) (victim stabbed to death after 
police failed to arrest husband—despite knowing he was 
visiting neighbors next door—after he violated order by 
entering her home and removing her furniture). This 
Court has recognized that even a minor domestic violence 
misdemeanor conviction can be a red flag for potentially 
lethal violence. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408-09. See also 
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Danger Assessment, https://www.
dangerassessment.org/DA.aspx (empirically supported 
instrument includes slapping, hitting, and minimally 
violent behaviors, in assessing risks of lethality).
For all these reasons, a leading expert in domestic 
violence and criminal justice states that “[o]ne of the most 
crucial steps to prevent lethal violence is to disarm abusers 
and keep them disarmed. . . [pursuant to] 18 U.S.C. Sec. 
922(g)(9).” Andrew R. Klein, Practice Implications of 
Current Domestic Violence Research, 37 (2008).
Petitioners’ attempt to cast doubt on the fact that 
“[d]omestic violence often escalates in severity over 
time,” as this Court recognized in Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1408, must fail. See Pet. Br. at 28 n. 10 (“the available 
data suggest that the notion that domestic disputes are 
repeated and necessarily evolve into ongoing violence 
. . . is inconclusive”) (emphasis added). Petitioners’ sole 
support for this argument is a questionable interpretation 
of a single study, which does not support their assertion. 
23 Moreover, one need not meet Petitioners’ straw man 
23.  Petitioners cite for this proposition, Christopher D. 
Maxwell, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Effects of Arrest on 
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of 100% consistency to know that as a general matter, 
domestic violence does indeed almost always repeat, 
and very often escalates. See e.g., Natalie Loder Clark, 
Crime Begins at Home: Let’s Stop Punishing Victims and 
Perpetuating Violence, 28 Wm. & mAry l. rev. 263, 291 
(1987). In fact, specialists in risk assessment agree that 
both a history of misdemeanor-level violence and coercive 
control are among the primary red flags for potential 
homicide. See Gavin de Becker, the gIFt oF FeAr 183 
(1997) (cataloging, among other indicators of domestic 
violence homicide risk, acts of coercive control such as 
resolving conflict with intimidation, bullying and violence; 
breaking or striking things in anger, and a history of 
police encounters for behavioral offenses, such as threats, 
stalking, assault and battery).24
Intimate Partner Violence: New Evidence From the Spouse Assault 
Replication Program, U.S. DOJ, nAt’l Inst. oF Just. 1-15 (2001). 
Counter to their depiction, the Maxwell study found, among other 
things, that “[a]rrest is associated with less repeat offending. . .” and 
that reports from victims showed greater recidivism than arrest 
rates alone. Id. at 2. Given the extremely short follow-up period of 
six months, id. at 3, this study’s recidivism findings are of limited 
significance for purposes of this case. See text, infra. 
24.  “Women’s risk of homicide (femicide) increased for women 
who separated from their abusers after living together, particularly 
when the abuser was highly controlling.” Connie J. A. Beck & 
Chitra Raghavan, Intimate Partner Abuse Screening in Custody 
Mediation: The Importance of Assessing Coercive Control, 48 FAm. 
Ct. rev. 556 (2010) (citing Jacquelyn C. Campbell, et al., Risk Factors 
for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite 
Case Control Study, 93 Am. J. oF PublIC heAlth, 1089-1097 (2003)); 
Campbell, Assessing Risk Factors, supra, at 14-19.
28
A comprehensive overview of empirical research 
on domestic violence and recidivism confirms that most 
individuals arrested for domestic violence have criminal 
records (not necessarily for domestic violence crimes),25 
and that “a hard core of a third of abusers will re-abuse 
in the short run and more will re-abuse in the longer 
run.”26 Studies have found that the rate of re-abuse during 
follow-up periods of four months to two years ranged 
from 24% to 60%.27 Moreover, “[r]e-abuse has been found 
to be substantially higher in longer term studies.”28 Two 
found abuse re-arrest or protection order violation rates 
of almost 60% over five and ten years.29 Of particular 
importance here, among the factors predictive of repeat 
abuse and of lethality, a key factor is the presence of 
firearms in the household.30
25.  Rodney Kingsworth, Intimate Partner Violence: 
Predictors of Recidivism in a Sample of Arrestees, 12 vIolenCe 
AgAInst Women 917-935 (2006) (finding that an offender’s prior arrest 
for any offense predicted re-arrest for intimate violence within an 
18-month follow-up period).
26.  Klein, Practical Implications, supra, at 26. 
27.  Id. at 26, n. 121.
28.  Id. at 27.
29.  Id. at 27 (citations omitted). Notably, the research also 
confirms that re-arrest is not a complete measure of recidivism, 
because so much ongoing abuse is either not reported or not subjected 
to arrest. Richard B. Felson, Jeffrey M. Ackerman, & Catherine 
Gallagher, Police Intervention and the Repeat of Domestic Assault, 
U.S. DOJ, nAt’l Inst. oF Just. (2005)(finding that only half of 
subsequent assaults were reported to police).
30.  Campbell, et al., Risk Factors for Femicide, supra, at 1089, 
1097; Campbell, Assessing Risk Factors, supra, at 14-19. 
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In short, the evidence shows that domestic violence 
incidents need not involve specific intent nor constitute 
major violence in order to be predictive of future risk, and 
that guns place victims of domestic violence at significantly 
greater risk. Against this backdrop, the government’s 
compelling interest in removing guns from those convicted 
of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, whether 
involving actual injury or offensive contact, cannot be 
gainsaid.
IV. M A N DAT ORY  A RRE ST  A N D  NO -DROP 
PROSECUTION POLICIES NEITHER REMOVE 
DISCRET ION  NOR  RE SU LT  I N  OV ER -
PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
Petitioners claim that, due to mandatory arrest laws 
and no-drop prosecution policies, many undeserving 
domestic violence misdemeanors are “swept” into the 
criminal justice system. Pet. Br. at 10, 26, 27. They assert 
that such policies mean that “police and prosecutors do 
not have the discretion to forego arrest and prosecution 
in cases where the conduct is minor or unclear.” Id. at 27 
(citation omitted). This is entirely incorrect.
First, the purpose of mandatory arrest laws and no-
drop prosecution policies is not to treat domestic violence 
more seriously than other crimes; it is to correct for 
past practices of refusing to treat domestic violence as 
a crime at all.31 Mandatory arrest laws and prosecution 
31.  Prior to the late 1980s, police often avoided responding 
to domestic violence calls and refused to make arrests. See Chief 
William L. Hart, et al., U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on 
Family Violence, FInAl rePort 16-18 (1984), http://babel.hathitrust.
org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00277593j;view=1up;seq=3; Joan Zorza, 
30
no-drop policies were correctives to widespread exercises 
of discretion to refuse to arrest or prosecute for 
domestic assaults. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of 
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 46, 48 (1992) (describing 
police departments with a “clear non-arrest policy”).
Petitioners greatly overstate the effect of these reform 
policies, however. Mandatory arrest laws and no-drop 
prosecution policies do not, and cannot, eliminate police 
or prosecutor discretion. Mandatory arrest means only 
that police may no longer refuse to arrest when there is 
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. See 
Zorza, supra, at 63, 64. Police must still assess the facts 
and determine if probable cause has been met; if it has, 
under mandatory arrest laws they are simply required 
to treat domestic violence no differently than any other 
crime. See Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760 (“We do 
not believe that these provisions of Colorado [mandatory 
arrest] law truly made enforcement of restraining orders 
mandatory. A well established tradition of police discretion 
has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest 
statutes”).
The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 
J. oF CrIm. l. & CrImInology 16-18 (1992); Cheryl Hanna, No Right 
to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions, 109 hArv. l. rev. 1849, 1857 (1996). Studies conducted 
in the 1980s and 1990s found that arrests occurred in only 3% to 14% 
of all intimate partner cases to which officers actually responded. Eve 
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in domestIC vIolenCe: 
the ChAngIng CrImInAl JustICe resPonse (1992) at vii, xvi. Similarly, 
prosecutors historically resisted prosecuting abuse, downgraded 
severe violence to misdemeanor charges, and dropped cases when 
victims expressed any ambivalence. See Zorza, supra; U.S. Attorney 
General’s Task Force Final Report (1984), supra.
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It is thus not surprising that, at best, mandatory 
arrest laws have resulted in arrest rates of approximately 
50%,32 a figure that should be taken in the context of the 
likelihood that official rates may not account for additional 
cases that are screened out “based on departmental 
priorities [even] before they are recorded as domestic 
or an officer is dispatched.”33 And despite the significant 
and valuable changes that mandatory arrest has brought 
to police practice, police response to domestic violence 
continues, in some quarters, to be deeply inadequate. 
See Barbara Hart, Policing Domestic Violence, 21 
nAt’l bulletIn on domestIC vIolenCe PreventIon, 1 
(2015) (“Much has changed in 40 years. Much has not.”) 
(describing two 2015 national surveys of domestic violence 
victims that reported widespread police hostility toward 
victims, refusal to believe reports of abuse, minimizing 
the risks, and other biases).
Similarly, no-drop policies were adopted in many 
prosecutors’ offices, not to prioritize domestic violence 
prosecutions over other crimes, but rather to overcome 
prosecutorial ambivalence and resistance to going forward 
with these often difficult cases.34 These policies are also 
32. David Hirschel, Domestic Violence Cases: What Research 
Shows About Arrest and Dual Arrest Rates (2008), retrieved at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222679.pdf. This report analyzed 
data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System in multiple 
jurisdictions in 2000. Among other things, it found that despite 
mandatory arrest policies, dual arrest remains quite low (about 
2%). Id. at § 1.
33.  Stark, supra at 62 (describing this practice as a “problem 
with accurately measuring attrition” [i.e., rates of police response]).
34.  As one prosecutor stated: “When I look back at how it 
used to be with battered women, I can see that it was a self-fulfilling 
32
necessary in order to remove the burden on victims of 
“choosing” whether to go forward or not – a practice that 
subjects victims to perpetrators’ coercion to drop or recant 
the charges. See Hanna, supra.
In fact, the picture today is of prosecution policies 
and practices that run the gamut across the country, from 
minimal prosecution to quite effective no-drop policies. 
A review of 120 studies from over 170 mostly urban 
jurisdictions in 44 states and the District of Columbia 
of intimate partner prosecutions between 1973 and 2006 
found a range of prosecution rates from 4.6% of arrests in 
Milwaukee in 1988-89 to 94% of arrests in Cincinnati, Ohio 
in 1993-96. Klein, Practical Implications, supra, at 41.
Even at their most rigorous, no-drop policies do not 
and cannot prevent prosecutors from (i) choosing not to 
file charges in the first instance, and (ii) dismissing cases 
when they deem the evidence insufficient to go forward. 35
prophesy. We’d file if she really wanted us to, but we knew that 
she’d want us to drop charges later . . . we may have even told her 
so. Then we sent her back home, often back to her abuser, without 
any support or protection at all. Sure enough, she wouldn’t follow 
through and we’d think, ‘It’s always the same with these cases.’” 
Gail A. Goolkasian, Confronting Domestic Violence: A Guide for 
Criminal Justice Agencies, nAt’l Inst. oF Just. 55 (1986).
35.  Barbara E. Smith, Robert Davis, Laura B. Nickles & 
Heather Davies, An Evaluation of Efforts to Implement No-Drop 
Policies:	Two	Central	Values	 in	Conflict,	Final Report vii (2001) 
(“no-drop is more a philosophy than a strict policy of prosecuting 
domestic violence cases. None of the prosecutors pursued every case 
they filed. Prosecutors were rational decision-makers who were most 
likely to proceed without the victim’s cooperation if they had a strong 
case based on other evidence.”).
33
Petitioners’ reliance on a Bureau of Justice Statistics 
study to suggest domestic violence is being prosecuted 
even more than other crimes overstates what the study 
was able to examine. Pet. Br. at 27, citing Erica Smith, et 
al., State Court Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, 
DOJ, bureAu oF Just. stAt. (2008) (“Smith”). That study 
actually measured only prosecutions that moved forward 
after	cases	were	filed	by prosecutors. Those cases which 
prosecutors screened out and declined to charge altogether 
“could not be included in the calculation of the prosecution 
rate because that information was not collected in the 
15-county study.” Smith , at 7. In fact, the follow up 
report on the same data states that 21-49% of cases were 
dismissed by prosecutors after initial charges were filed. 
Erica L. Smith & Donald J. Farole, Profile	of	Intimate	
Partner Violence Cases in Large Urban Counties, u.s. 
doJ, bureAu oF Just. stAt. (2009) (Table 17).
The bottom line continues to be that only a fraction 
of domestic violence incidents result in arrest, and 
far fewer result in prosecution, let alone conviction.36 
Petitioners’ hyperbolic claims about mandatory arrest 
laws and no-drop prosecution policies sweeping many 
cases of questionable, minor or innocent conduct into the 
criminal justice system, let alone going to conviction, are 
thus demonstrably false. Therefore, Petitioners’ claim 
that applying the Lautenberg Amendment to reckless 
batteries will deprive many innocent or fundamentally 
benign individuals of their guns is, quite simply, fiction. 
See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“If a seemingly minor 
act like this draws the attention of authorities and leads 
36.  Stark, supra at 62-63; Smith & Farole, supra (percentages 
of filed charges that went to conviction ranged from 17% to 89% 
across 16 jurisdictions).
34
to a successful prosecution for a misdemeanor offense, it 
does not offend common sense or the English language to 
characterize the resulting conviction as a ‘misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence’”).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons described in this brief, Amici 
respectfully submit that this Court should affirm the decision 
of the First Circuit upholding Petitioners’ convictions on 
the grounds that the Lautenberg Amendment’s definition 
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence includes 
convictions for reckless battery.
   Respectfully submitted,
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